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I. INTRODUCTION 
Environmental adjudication is becoming increasingly pluralistic, reflecting that the resolution of 
environmental disputes falls within a complex administrative state.  No longer the sole preserve of the 
‘ordinary’ courts, adjudicating the ‘problems of modernity’1 takes place at multiple points, within and 
between social groups and peoples, and occurs in different institutional forms, employing different 
problem-solving mechanisms.2 Problems generated or controlled by the administrative state - including 
environmental problems - may be resolved by generic or specialist courts, tribunals, departmental 
officials, ministers, ad hoc bodies, or through various forms of alternate dispute resolution, and initial 
adjudicative decisions may be checked or supervised in a multitude of fora using different legal tests. 
In an attempt to make structural sense of this plurality, Michael Asimow reports that most 
administrative systems have three phrases of ‘adjudication’: an initial administrative decision; a first -
stage challenge to that decision (either by the same institution or an external body); and then some form 
of judicial review or appeal.3 But he also notes that adjudicatory resources – i.e. the use of resources 
that best facilitate substantive accuracy and procedural fairness – tend to be invested in one phase only.4 
The effect of this intense focus is to create an adjudicatory fulcrum, around which a symbiotic process 
swirls: the state prioritizing resources at this level and the commensurate response of private actors 
involved in the dispute, who are more likely to instruct ‘legal counsel’, in turn resulting in greater 
‘adjudicatory structures’ and ‘procedural safeguards’.5 
Environmental problems present particular challenges for adjudication and nations have 
responded in different ways to managing disputes about the environment. A multitude of different 
problem-solving institutions are employed, operating in different organisational and regulatory 
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contexts. In this paper, we apply Asimow’s frame to environmental adjudication in two jurisdictions – 
England and Wales, and New Zealand. Our aim is twofold.  Firstly we map adjudicatory pluralism in 
those nations in order to see if the spectrum appears coherent and the allocation of roles justified. In 
Asimow’s schematic (utilising US parlance),6 ‘adjudication’ covers initial disputes before 
administrative bodies and appellate decisions,7 and we adopt this wide typology. To clarify, we confine 
our analysis to state-sponsored adjudicatory bodies (excluding dispute resolution mechanisms 
ordinarily governed by contractual agreements and other private law mechanisms). Secondly, we 
consider whether an adjudicative ‘fulcrum’ exists within that spectrum, and if so what might be the 
relevance of that focus.  We selected these particular jurisdictions for a number of reasons: there are 
similarities in the legal cultures of both nations; they have similar albeit not identical constitutional 
arrangements that are important for our exercise, for example there is no clear constitutional prohibition 
against ‘adjudication’ or ‘judicial functions’ being undertaken by bodies outside the ‘ordinary’ courts; 
and in both jurisdictions a plurality of bodies exists at each stage of the adjudicatory process. Our wider 
rational is not necessarily to identify and learn lessons from one legal culture in order to apply in the 
other; rather we are using the lens of comparison to show the complexity of environmental adjudication.  
The paper has the following structure. In part 2 we briefly consider the main characteristics of 
environmental adjudication, highlighting its challenging nature. Part 3 sets out the regulatory and 
institutional landscape in England and Wales and part 4 undertakes the same exercise with respect to 
New Zealand. Our mapping exercise shows that New Zealand has responded to the challenges of 
environmental dispute-resolution quite deliberately with discrete regulatory and complementary 
institutional design, whereas England and Wales have not. In England and Wales there is a clear lack 
of coherence that manifests itself in a complex and diverse approach to environmental adjudication, 
both in terms of institutional frameworks and substantive matters of adjudication. Surprisingly, we 
discover that forms of adjudication mired in legal formalism are not necessarily correlative with 
certainty, equality, and coherence in environmental disputes, particularly when compared to 
adjudicatory structures that have been created to more readily respond to the nature of the problems that 
they address.  
This analysis creates implications for both policy-development and scholarly research. The 
need for a dedicated environment court has been debated for many years in the UK, but is an issue that 
may arise again post-Brexit with the loss of the supervisory function of the European Commission and 
the European Court of Justice.8  Our analysis suggests that if the UK Government wants to foster 
certainty, equality, and coherence in environmental dispute-resolution, the development of a specialist 
environment court may need re-visiting. In terms of scholarly endeavours, this mapping exercise fills a 
gap in the existing literature but it also raises an important question that has deeper resonance: can 
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Asimow’s thesis be extended to demonstrate that a clear adjudicatory focus - or lack of focus - impacts 
upon the role that adjudication plays in the development of environmental norms? Critically, therefore 
we highlight the need and lay the basis for scholarship to explore the links between adjudicatory forms 
and structures and the development of environmental norms. 
 
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ADJUDICATION 
 
A wide range of environmental disputes may be determined though adjudication, from access to 
environmental information and environmental impact assessments, the take and use of natural resources 
(including bio-diversity), land-use planning, pollution discharges, regulatory approvals for dangerous 
or controversial activities (such as releasing genetically modified organisms), to sanctions and 
enforcement. Our focus is deliberately on administrative and regulatory regimes specifica l ly 
introduced to manage the use of environmental resources (land, air, water and biodiversity) and 
environmental problems such as pollution (while not encompassing common law actions such 
as nuisance that might impact environmental media). We take this narrow approach in the 
attempt to establish the degree to which coherence emerges in the adjudicatory systems that 
are expressly set up to deal with environmental law disputes.9   
Many of these environmental disputes have characteristics that create challenges for 
adjudication.10  Uppermost, is normative contestability11 - as the Chief Justice of New Zealand has 
written, ‘environmental decisions by their very nature must be political.’12 For example, decisions 
sanctioning particular activities may impose risks on people and communities, and this reality has 
implications for adjudication. Decision-makers may have to make predictive decisions about the future 
as opposed to fact-finding in relation to the past; allocate risk-burdens and benefits; determine what 
degree of harm is acceptable;13and they may be concerned with a wide range of actors and those 
impacted upon that transcend traditional party decisions, so undertaking polycentric decision-making. 
But environmental impacts may also be complex and multi-scalar (both in geographical and temporal 
terms), uncertain or unknown, and dispute-resolution can be expert-opinion heavy. In the UK, disputes 
will often concern whether an administrative body has adequately assessed or taken certain risks into 
account. For example in R. v Secretary of State for Environment and Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries 
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and Food, the UK claimant sought to challenge the consent granted to the planting of genetically 
modified (GMO) maize in proximity to his own fields partly on grounds that the regulatory authority 
failed to appropriately assess the risks.14  Challenges against GMOs licenses in New Zealand have also 
centred on the validity of risk-assessment.15  
An additional complicating factor is that environmental adjudication occurs against a fast-
changing backdrop.16 Ecological conditions, scientific knowledge, policy and legal instruments can 
undergo rapid change.17 This creates problems for those engaged in decision-making and adjudication, 
requiring them to stay abreast of legal doctrine and regulatory initiatives, but it also creates the risk of 
policy contradictions or vacuums emerging. In the case of McMorn, the plaintiff found himself caught 
in an inter-agency policy-dispute concerning applications to kill listed birds that were threatening his 
game-keeping business, and (although the Court did not explicitly engage with the underlying policy 
considerations) it ultimately fell to the UK High Court to fill the vacuum.18 In the UK, the scope for the 
courts to become entangled in questions of legality of environmental decision-making is, moreover, 
likely to increase as a result of Brexit in light of the UK Government’s view that any supervision 
previously conducted by e.g. the EU Commission or the Court of Justice will fall to the UK courts.   In 
reaching decisions, adjudicators may be operating against a statutory background that is vague and 
open-ended when it comes to specific objectives19 and they may have to draw upon and adapt a mix of 
substantive public and private law doctrine to resolve disputes. Further, statutory interpretation in 
environmental law can at times be more akin to ‘legislative fact-finding’20 and adjudicators may be 
required to giving legal meaning to complex ecological and socio-cultural ontologies which, as one of 
us has written elsewhere, creates difficulties for retaining a strict division between law and facts, or fact 
and values.21  
The multiplicity of considerations at play is further compounded by the fact that the statutory 
system of environmental law often is made up by overlapping structures of regulation and law, 
emanating from different legislative and institutional sources. In England and Wales, a great deal of 
environmental law (albeit far from all) has in the past 40 years been driven by EU law in the form of 
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secondary legislation drawn up to give force to environmental objectives of the EU treaties. 22 Further, 
the various processes of law-making - implementation and interpretation - are significantly shaped by 
non-binding, yet persuasive, policy guidance, frameworks and environmental law ‘principles’.23 Often, 
a reviewing institution will have to grapple with considerations that are not necessarily given force 
through traditional means of law or regulation but instead drawn up by means of technocratic processes 
in an attempt to give legal meaning and effect to these principles and concepts,24and an adjudicator’s 
interpretative role may impact upon and help to craft secondary instruments including policy documents 
and planning frameworks.    
A further layer of complexity is added by contributory participation in decision-making. Public 
participation is formative to much modern environmental law, and facilitated through specific legal 
regimes that address rights of access to environmental information, public participation in decision-
making and access to review mechanisms.25 Adjudicators may be required to oversee participatory and 
consultative processes that have the effect of creating structures for construing the law while 
simultaneously giving substantive content to the law. Supervisory bodies are often requested to examine 
and invalidate administrative decisions for failing to adhere to the requirements of public participation. 
Recent examples in the UK include Walton v Scottish Ministers
26
 before the Supreme Court, questioning 
the validity of the decision-making in the absence of adherence to public participation requirements and 
R. (Greenpeace Ltd) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ,27 requiring the Administrative Court 
to assess government undertakings on consultation processes against nuclear energy policy.  Many 
similar examples are found in the New Zealand context.  The first environmental law case to be heard 
by the (then newly created) Supreme Court concerned appropriate levels of participation.28  
For all these reasons and more, environmental dispute-resolution is deeply complex and multi-
faceted.  As a phenomenon it appears to beautifully illustrate Rubin’s exhortion that the ‘problems of 
modernity … require new rules and particularised remedies, and deliberately designed agencies’.29 And 
in mapping the adjudicative spectrum in England and Wales and New Zealand, we carry Rubin’s 
thought forward into our analysis.  The next part of the paper considers environmental adjudication in 
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England and Wales, sketching the regulatory landscape and mapping the adjudicative institutions sited 
within it. 
 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL ADJUDICATION IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
A. Regulatory Landscape 
In the context of environmental regulation and adjudication in England and Wales, three important 
trends stand out. First, towards the end of the 20 th century we see increasing centralisation and 
integration. As environmental harms and risks (and the understanding thereof) grow more complex, the 
response has been for greater regulatory integration and institutional centralisation, with the 
commensurate development of state bureaucracy.  Partly as a result of capacity and costs-implications 
and partly as a result of the need for in-depth knowledge and expertise, environmental regulatory 
capability has increasingly been centralised in few large regulatory agencies.30 Control of significant 
pollution activities became ‘integrated’ in both a regulatory and institutional sense, subject to 
technocratic permitting processes, administered by one regulator - the Environment Agency.31  One 
notable exception to this centralisation is the planning system where authority for development control 
remains vested in local planning authorities (though with significant central control). 
Second, the impact of EU law is (at this point still) important, and serves to further enhance 
and support the trends of integration and centralisation. The imposition of supranational environmental 
norms in the form of EU Directives necessarily places a responsibility on the state when it comes to 
implementing the rules and norms; this is best done centrally or, at least, through means of centrally 
prescribed regulations.32  
Nevertheless, this integration is far from comprehensive. The third point is that in contrast to 
the picture in New Zealand, the UK still has a huge array of environmental statutes and regulations. 
From earnest beginnings in 19th century common law controls, a haphazard suite of statutory initiatives 
aimed at minimizing environmental risks took hold in the mid-1800s in the form conventional 
regulatory techniques such as licensing and permitting. These methods have increasingly been 
supplemented and sometimes replaced by a wide range of reflexive mechanisms, including economic 
and other ‘non-command and control’ regulatory tools and private law mechanisms, that have 
significantly expanded the regulatory choices available to government. One striking example is the 
development of participation and information-based instruments not previously found in the ‘toolbox’ 
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of the administrative state (though mechanisms for public participation have historically played an 
important role in land-use decision-making).33 Within environmental regulation, access to 
environmental information and public participation in decision-making is facilitated through a 
combination of EU Directives34 and international legal instruments, all to varying degrees afforded 
statutory endorsement in domestic law.35 The move towards participation and transparency is 
compelling: it arguably leads to better decision-making and enhances legitimacy. It may, however, also 
have had an impact on the extent to which the courts are called to scrutinise administrative decisions. 
Prior to the introduction of participatory regimes, ‘environmental regulation was an essentially private 
process concerning the regulator and the regulated alone. The new arrangements [….] have opened up 
the process to outside scrutiny [providing] the foundation on which a legal challenge can be based.’36 
Added to this is the likelihood that as more individuals and NGOs have been involved in and taken part 
in a decision-making process, the more likely they are to feel aggrieved when a decision goes against 
them, encouraging further recourse to the courts.37 In light of this complex regulatory landscape, it is 
relevant to consider the adjudicatory spectrum in England and Wales.  
B. Pluralism and the push towards judicialisation 
In England and Wales, initial decisions concerning environmental disputes take place across a wide and 
complex spectrum of statutory regimes and fora. ‘External’ actors undertake supervision of primary 
decisions and the law provides little scope for internal review of administrative decisions. Consequently 
a strong emphasis is maintained on the role afforded to judicial and ‘court -like’ institutions, and it is 
within the traditional courts or court-like bodies that the adjudicatory focus appears to rest. For example, 
the Planning Inspectorate, the First Tier Tribunal, the inferior and superior courts, and a special planning 
chamber within the Administrative Court all play significant roles in supervising planning and 
environmental law decisions.38 This supervision is effected through a mixture of rights of statutory 
appeals – both on the merits and on points of law - and common-law judicial review, with the later 
playing a significant role as discussed below. It is difficult to trace any coherence in the applicability of 
different routes, forms and standards of supervision. As one commentator puts it in the context of 
statutory appeals: the system for regulatory appeals ‘lacks common procedure and intelligibility [and] 
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there is little in the way of underlying principle[s]’.39 That is, the system for environmental adjudication 
in England and Wales lacks the complete and thorough systematised approach seen in other 
jurisdictions. These developments are best highlighted by considering that in relation Asimow’s ‘first -
stage’ challenge, Macrory’s work highlights nearly 50 different types and routes of appeal to a myriad 
of different bodies.40 To provide a snapshot of this complexity, statutory appeals to the ‘ordinary courts’ 
are made: to the Magistrates Court under the Ozone-Depleting Substances Regulations 201541 and the 
Fluorinated Greenhouse Gases Regulations 2009;42 the County Courts under the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990 Part IIA, relating to specific charging notices;43and to the High Court under the 
Offshore Combustion Installations (Pollution Prevention and Control) Regulations 201344 and REACH 
Enforcement Regulations 200845 among others.  
 One of the more significant avenues of statutory appeal in environmental law is the right of 
appeal found in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 available to developers wishing to appeal the 
refusal for an application or the imposition of a planning condition.  First-stage appeals against local 
planning authority decisions are made on the merits to the minister but in practice are delegated to the 
Planning Inspectorate for determination.46 While the Planning Inspectorate is not classified as a judicial 
organ47 – it is an executive agency, embedded in a Department of State – the Inspectorate often ends up 
taking a ‘court-like’ approach when hearing appeals and its decisions are authoritative sources of 
interpretation without formally creating legal precedents.48 Similarly, parties often come to rely on legal 
counsel when appearing before the Inspectorate (whether appeals are conducted on the papers, at  a 
hearing, or a public local inquiry) and an Inspector is required to notify parties of his/her decision in 
writing and to provide reasons.49 In addition to hearing statutory appeals in planning law, the Planning 
Inspectorate also hears appeals for legality under a range of other statutory regimes, including the 
pollution control and waste management systems found in the Environment al Permitting Regulations 
2016.50 Often these appeals concern enforcement notices, revocation notices or other significant 
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enforcement actions that impact significantly on the livelihood of businesses. In the vast majority of 
cases the appeal is dismissed.51  
A relatively recent development – again highlighting the argument that the adjudicatory focus 
is upon formalism - was the creation in 2010 of an environmental tribunal within the General Regulatory 
Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal.52 In one sense, the Tribunal is arguably a manifestation of the trend 
alluded to above in respect to proliferation of routes and systems of appeals in British environmental 
law. It hears merits appeals under a number of administrative environmental regimes, including appeals 
against enforcement notices taken in pursuance of the Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2011, 
transposing EU waste law,53 appeals against decisions taken under the environmental civil sanctions 
orders,54 and appeals against notices issued under the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009.55  But from 
a relatively low base point, the T ribunal has witnessed an iterative increase in the number of 
administrative regimes from which it hears appeals.56 Tellingly, however, the Tribunal was created by 
way of administrative reorganisation of the General Regulatory Chamber and not by legislative means. 
This serves to highlight the somewhat ambivalent nature towards the Tribunal and marks a significant 
departure from the considered and deliberate creation of so-called ‘one stop shop’57 environment courts 
and tribunals in other jurisdictions, including New Zealand. While the T ribunal is very much 
conceptualised as part of the judiciary (as envisaged by the Franks Report and as with the tribunal 
system in Britain more generally) as opposed to forming part of the administrative apparatus, the main 
driver behind the creation of the Tribunal was the introduction of the civil sanctions regime introduced 
in 2008.58 These sanctions were introduced following the Macrory Report, in part to secure a more 
effective system of compliance across the regulatory spectrum by allowing regulators more flexible 
mechanisms of enforcement.59 In other words, and unlike similar institutions in other jurisdictions, the 
T ribunal was created in order to keep administrative agencies with increasingly wide-ranging powers 
in check and not because the executive thought it desirable to create a separate, specialist forum for 
environmental adjudication. Having said that, the bulk of the Tribunal’s case law has centred not on the 
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use of civil sanctions but on the designation of vulnerable zones as required by the Agriculture Nitrate 
Directive,60 primarily because designations significantly restrict an occupier’s ability to farm.61 
 From this overview of environmental adjudication in England and Wales several important 
points emerge. Primarily, the spectrum of adjudication represents a mixed picture with a wide range of 
institutions engaging in supervision, employing varying levels of scrutiny. In this mixed picture one 
encounters procedures akin to administrative review yet conducted by court -like institutions (such as 
the Planning Inspectorate);62 a specific Tribunal that is formally part of the judiciary, though its creation 
and operations are akin to administrative review proceedings; and the ordinary courts, hearing, as we 
have seen, a combination of statutory appeals and judicial review cases. These different institutional 
forms range from the ‘departmentally embedded’, to the specialist adjudicator, to the ‘pure’ or 
‘traditional’ adjudication conducted by the generalist courts.63  
Moreover, in the context of the expansion of the environmental administrative state, it seems 
that a significant driver behind the institutional design of the newer forms of adjudication is found in 
the regulatory regimes themselves – for example, with the creation of the First-tier Environment 
T ribunal. Similarly, the strong drive towards public participation, manifested for example in the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (‘EIA’) regime, has served to shape environmental adjudication 
significantly in so far as this may well have led to the courts being called into action at a higher 
frequency than was previously the case. It is notable for example, that the courts have issued few 
decisions concerning the extensive regulatory system in place controlling industrial pollution 
(Environmental Permitting Regulations 2016) though the system allows for public participation and 
involvement much to the same extent at the EIA regime,64 whereas they have played a prominent role 
in shaping the interpretation of planning law and EIA norms.65 In summary, the adjudication of 
environmental disputes is taking place within a myriad of different legal frames and supervision is 
effected by merits review, appeals on points of law, and judicial review.  While it is impossible to 
identify one institution creating a clear adjudicatory fulcrum - as we will see is the case with New 
Zealand - the overriding adjudicatory focus is one of formalism and judicialisation, with the ordinary 
courts remaining a dominant force.  
 
C. Tensions and doctrinal inconsistency 
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Institutional arrangements shape adjudicative forms. One important theme that follows from the 
continuing dominance of the generalist courts is that environmental adjudication is necessarily 
conceptualised within the confines of established public law adjudication more generally. That is, 
notwithstanding the characteristics of environmental adjudication highlighted above, the courts in 
England and Wales are, to a greater degree, approaching environmental law from within the confines 
of an existing ‘practice’ of public law thereby refraining from carving out special and specific measures 
for environmental law cases.66 This approach creates inherent tensions. 
A good example concerns the on-going judicial debates about what level of scrutiny to afford 
judicial review of environmental law cases. These debates centre on the claim that environmental cases 
deserve a higher level of judicial scrutiny than is traditionally afforded in judicial review subject to the 
Wednesbury67 grounds. The primary reason for affording environmental cases a high level of scrutiny 
is the 1998 Aarhus Convention on access to environmental information, public participation and access 
to justice in environmental matters to which the UK (and the EU) is a party. The Convention provides 
for a series of procedural ‘rights’, allowing citizens to engage with environmental decision -making in 
order to facilitate ‘the right of every person of present and future generations to live in an environment 
adequate to his or her health and well-being’.68 In respect to access to justice, the Convention provides 
for, firstly, ‘access to review [of] the substantive and procedural legality’ of specific decisions taken in 
pursuance of the Convention’s public participation provisions in art. 9(2) and, secondly, that citizens 
are afforded a general accees to ‘administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions 
by private persons and public authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the 
environment’ in art. 9(3)69 These rights are given direct effect through changes to a host of EU 
Directives.70 The Compliance Committee of the Aarhus Convention has stated that art. 9 constitutes a 
substantive right: that is, citizens are entitled to have the ‘substantive legality’ of a decision reviewed 
and has questioned whether judicial review in the UK affords this right.71 Consequently in a string of 
recent cases, the UK courts have been forced to consider whether environmental cases merit special 
treatment.72  
This case law suggests that the courts are not prepared to automatically discard traditional 
doctrine for the sake of environmental claims and while there might be good reasons for maintaining a 
focus on established practices - after all, modern environmental law is ‘public law’ and administrative 
in nature - this gives rise to inconsistency across different components of environmental law. In 
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accordance with judicial review doctrine, the courts apply varying standards of review to initial 
decisions, leading to a willingness to engage more fully with some environmental law decisions than 
others.  Of course, in judicial review, relativity matters: ‘context is everything’,73 but it is not necessarily 
the ‘environmental aspects’ that are determinative. The overall effect is that outcomes differ in cases 
that may appear to the litigants to raise similar issues for environmental dispute resolution. Public 
participation in all its forms provides a good illustration of this tension.  For example, in Birkett the 
Court of Appeal found that the refusal by a public authority to accommodate a request for release of 
environmental information must be subjected to a thorough review, reviewing the ‘merits, both the 
factual and legal, of a decision […] afresh’.74 The basis for this rationale is found in the underlying EU 
Directive on Access to Environmental Information,75 implemented through the Environmental 
Information Regulations 2004,76 providing for a de novo review of the administrative decision.77 The 
need for a thorough, substantive review was endorsed in Evans, when the Supreme Court rejected the 
claim that the requirement for a substantive de novo review of a refusal to release environmental 
information would be met through judicial review. Lord Neuberger’s judgment is clear: the scope of 
traditional judicial review does not ordinarily allow for an assessment of the merits of the decision as 
required by the Directive.78 While not concerned with access to information, the decision of McMorn 
also supports a close-look scrutiny for ‘environmental decisions’ that impact private property.  In 
McMorn, Ouseley J determined that a ‘more intensive form of scrutiny’79 was required of a series of 
decisions taken by Natural England, denying the claimant licenses to shoot raptors that were taking his 
livestock.80  
In contrast, in other important areas of environmental law that impact information gathering, 
dissemination, and subsequent decision-making, the courts have refused to entertain the claim that the 
subject matter invites a special level of scrutiny. In relation to the scrutiny of decisions and the 
assessment of statutory duties arising out of the EIA Directive and its implementing regulations, the 
courts have repeatedly stressed the decisions by local planning authorities are scrutinised on 
Wednesbury grounds only.  No higher Aarhus level of scrutiny applies.81  In Smyth Sales LJ 
empathically rejected the claim that an intensive review was required in a decision concerning impact 
assessment under the Habitats Directive, arguing that there was no material difference in the context in 
which the rules of the Habitats Directive were applied to that of the EIA Directive: both sets of rules 
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being applied in the context of the domestic planning system.82 In seeking to further distinguish the 
context of the Habitats Directive (and thereby also the EIA Directive) from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Evans and its requirement for a heightened scrutiny in environmental information cases, 
Sales LJ found that the contexts and terms of the underlying directives simply varied too much.83 But 
the decision in Smyth is troubling, and the primary reason is that the wording of the underlying directives 
is practically identical. Article 11(1)(b) of the EIA Directive thus confers the right to a ‘review 
procedure […] to challenge the substantive or procedural legality of decisions, acts or omissions´ of 
the directive.84 The Access to Environmental Information Directive similarly provides for a review 
procedure in which ‘the acts or omissions of the public authority concerned can be reviewed’.85 On the 
face of it, affording a more intensive scrutiny under the Environmental Information Directive but not 
under the EIA Directive (and the Habitats Directive with it) runs contrary to the wording of the 
provisions.  Sales LJ justified his decision on the basis that the statutory contexts of the regimes are 
fundamentally different.  Context may well have been determinative, but again not in a sense that 
necessarily makes sense to environmental disputants. In cases that are seen as falling within the well-
established planning regime, the courts have traditionally refrained from scrutinising decisions with any 
intensity. As pointed out by Carnwath LJ: often these decisions ‘require[.] the exercise of judgment, on 
technical or other planning grounds, and [that] is a function for which the courts are ill-equipped, but 
which is well-suited to the familiar role of local planning authorities.’86 This contextual restriction does 
not appear to apply in other areas where ‘officials’ make determinations about access to environmental 
information, for example the Environmental Information Regulations. Ultimately, this scenario leads to 
an inconsistent application of the Aarhus Convention.   
A further explanation for inconsistency in decisions may well be found in the very nature of 
environmental adjudication itself. As alluded to above, in environmental cases the courts often end up 
having to strike a fine balance between determining what essentially is a ‘merits’ question and what 
falls within a claim of illegality. Examples include the decision in Downs, in which the Court of Appeal 
rebuked Collins J, sitting in the Administrative Court, for having substituted his own opinion for that 
of the decision-maker when faced with a lack of scientific consensus in the context of risks arising from 
pesticide spraying.87 Likewise in R. (Mott) v Environment Agency, the Court of Appeal held that Cooke 
J in the Administrative Court had been too keen to scrutinise the scientific underpinnings of the 
Environment Agency’s decision to restrict fishing rights in the Severn estuary; a decision which was 
‘the result of an amalgam of assessments which are in part factual and in part predictive in nature’ and 
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that Cooke J had ‘strayed beyond what is proper for a reviewing judge dealing with complex scientific 
materials’.88 Instead, the Court found, that Cooke J ought to have afforded the Environment Agency a 
wider ‘margin of discretion.’89 The risk of straying into merits review is perhaps even more likely in 
cases involving EU environmental law (as many cases do) where the underlying legal obligations are 
couched in vague and open-ended terms subject to purposive rules of interpretation.90 When scrutinising 
such cases, it is sometimes hard to suppress the sense that claimants are seeking a merits review of the 
decision, reflecting the ‘problematic nature of the merits-legality dichotomy’ identified by TRS Allan, 
a distinction that in his view turns out to be ‘largely incoherent.91 We can see the real impact of this 
incoherence in environmental adjudication. In a 2003 study, Macrory and Woods thus suggested that 
two-thirds of examined environmental cases (excluding planning and EIA cases) appeared merits driven 
and an attempt to re-litigate the substantive issues.  92 
The EIA regime in particular has provided a fertile background against which claimants and 
counsel can frame what is in reality a claim for a merits review as a question of illegality, relying on 
the underlying open-ended provisions of the EIA Directive - an option that, for example, was not 
available to claimants in planning law prior to the EIA regime being implemented.  In Dillner, the 
claimants sought to challenge the implementation of a tree management plan adopted by a local council 
on grounds that the ensuing felling of trees required an EIA and the Council’s failure to conduct one 
such resulted in the plan being illegal.93 Despite a rather lengthy judgment, Gilbart J gave short shrift 
to the claimant’s case, arguing that the case effectively ought to be construed around the Highway Act 
1980, and the responsibility of authorities to repair and maintain highways. In short, it had nothing to 
do with environmental impact assessments. Throughout the judgment, Gilbart J engages in a captivating 
exercise of framing the question before him, highlighting that what might appear to be facts to one party 
are normative values to another.  In examining this inherent complexity in detail, His Honour reveals a 
core difficulty for decision-makers in adjudicating over the environment. The ‘evidence’ presented by 
the claimants was found to be irrelevant to the obligations arising from the Highways Act 1980, 
notwithstanding that it was adduced to support the claim that felling of tree would have a ‘significant’ 
environmental impact.94 As Gilbart J observes: ‘I suspect that is because some of those mounting and 
advising the campaign against removal [of the trees] had not got to grips with the effect of the duties 
under the HA 1980, and saw the idea of the removal of trees as inherently objectionable, and as 
unlawful.’95 The decision in Dillner emphasises that the courts will frame and approach environmental 
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claims from the confines of existing practices and frameworks – and of course the complex legislative 
compartmentalisation of the environment in UK law leads to divergent approaches to what may seem 
to the public to be classic environmental issues.   But it also highlights the fine line that exists in 
environmental law cases between facts and values, and the difficulty in avoiding reviewing the merits 
in proceedings for legality.  
To summarise, Asimow’s clear adjudicatory fulcrum is difficult to identify in the English-
Welsh context, however the generalist courts retain a significant role and appear to establish the 
predominant adjudicatory focus. Importantly, a primary avenue available to claimants is often that of 
traditional judicial review (for example, third parties seeking to challenge planning decisions have 
recourse only to judicial review, even though applicants have access to a full merits review by the 
Planning Inspectorate,). This focus poses challenges for all actors involved in environmental 
adjudication. Certain subsets of the law provide a better background for challenges. Many cases come 
across as little more than an attempt to engage in full merit review of an administrative decision, creating 
particular difficulties for the courts. Further, given the parameters and drivers of judicial review, the 
courts have understandably been reluctant to accept any contention that they ought to afford 
environmental claims special consideration.  Context may impact decisions but not necessarily in a way 
that makes sense to environmental disputants, leading to an inconsistency in what may appear to 
claimants to be factually similar claims. From our initial mapping exercise, we can see that formalism 
in environmental adjudication may not necessarily correlate to certainty, equality, and coherence for 
environmental litigants, particularly when it operates against such a fractured regulatory backdrop. To 
illustrate this point further, we can turn to New Zealand – a jurisdiction within which adjudicatory 
structures have been created to more readily respond to the nature of environmental problems.  
 
IV.  ENVIRONMENTAL ADJUDICATION IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
A. Regulatory framework 
Before embarking on any analysis of institutional infrastructure, it is important to sketch an 
understanding of the regulatory framework in New Zealand.  Environmental regulation is comparatively 
simple to the highly complex-legislative web that exists in England and Wales primarily because the 
Government took a conscious decision to address environmental problems in an integrated way. 96 One 
primary statute, the Resource Management Act 1991 (‘RMA’), governs the environmental management 
of all land, air and water in New Zealand and merges many of the individual regimes seen in England 
and Wales – pollution controls, biodiversity protection, permitting for activities such as water take, 
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town and country land-use planning, enforcement etc. – into one ‘coherent, integrated and structured 
scheme’.97 The result is substantial integration across the management of environmental domains, 
through legislation and policy, and between institutions, so creating a holistic approach to 
environmental management.  In this way, environmental law in New Zealand mirrors ecology. While 
other regulatory regimes exist to respond more discretely to specific environmental management issues 
(such as the Climate Change Response Act 2002, Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 
and Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Activities Act 2011)98 and 
interrelate with the RMA in different ways, the RMA has the widest application.  
Correctly understood, the RMA constitutes ‘goals focused’99 legislation and the stated ‘goal’ 
of the RMA is to promote ‘the sustainable management’ of natural and physical resources100 - and many 
other environmental states in New Zealand also state a purpose of ‘sustainability’-101 but, as Dryzek 
comments, sustainability connotes ‘a discourse, not a concept, and still less a scient ific concept’.102  
This helps in part to explain why in the New Zealand context the main environmental and planning 
statutes constitute frameworks, delegating various roles and responsibilities to different institutions, 
providing them with flexible powers to craft solutions in respect of environmental conflicts, and 
ensuring wide public participatory processes.  Fisher has described the RMA ‘as a ‘power map’: it is 
enabling institutions, allocating power, framing legal discourses’ and in that sense, may be conceived 
as part of ‘environmental constitutionalism’.103  
For our purposes, the manifestation of this ‘environmental constitutionalism’ enables 
governance to take place at a multitude of different points – geographical, temporal, within and between 
social groups and peoples - and by utilising different legal mechanisms. And it also enables governance 
by different institutional forms including decision-making that flows from various adjudicatory bodies 
because of the flexible and participatory procedures employed by those bodies, sheer range of remedies 
granted, and wide-ranging impact of their decisions.104  
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B. Adjudicatory Pluralism and Specialisation 
Adopting Asimow’s typology and schematic, a spectrum of environmental ‘adjudicators’ exists in New 
Zealand, reflecting a complex pluralism. However, at a simple, pragmatic level, in contrast to the UK 
scenario, this division and allocation of adjudicatory roles appears capable of justification. At the ‘initial 
decision’ stage, this spectrum includes both executive and judicial decision-making. It includes 
decision-making by: ministers (in relation to the allocation of national resources, such as crown-owned 
minerals and fishing quota);105 local authorities (who determine resource management applications in 
their localities, particularly under the RMA); Boards of Inquiry (that are established on an ad hoc basis 
to hear some RMA applications that have significant, national impacts);106 the ‘ordinary’ courts that 
play a role in determining ex post facto compensatory disputes (including civil law tortious actions, 
statutory liability for oil tanker spills under the Maritime Transport Act 1994, and some enforcement 
actions); the Environmental Protection Authority (that is primarily concerned with national regimes 
conscribed by international treaty commitments); and, in some instances, the specialist Environment 
Court. In terms of ‘first stage’ challenges to initial decisions, most appeals are heard by bodies external 
to and independent from the initial decision maker: there are very few instances of appeal-routes being 
embedded within the same institution.107 Appellate bodies constitute: the independent Catch History 
Review Committee (that review ministerial decisions in relation to fishing quota eligibility);108ad hoc 
Boards of Inquiry (that hear ‘called-in’ RMA appeals that are nationally significant); the superior courts 
that determine statutory appeals on a point of law or judicially review executive actions; and the 
Environment Court, that hears de novo merits appeals predominantly in relation to RMA decisions by 
local authorities.109 In relation to Asimow’s ‘final stage’ challenges, appeals are made to the superior 
courts. 
Importantly for our mapping exercise, most of these decision-making institutions (excluding 
the ‘ordinary’ courts) have a multiplicity of functions: regulatory, administrative and adjudicative. This 
functional-plurality is justified by the concentration of expertise in these bodies, but it manifests in part 
because environmental problem-solvers need to be able to draw upon responsive problem-solving 
mechanisms that may include traditional legal remedies, administrative or reflexive responses.  To that 
extent, these bodies demonstrate that in the New Zealand environmental context less emphasis is placed 
upon ‘traditional politico-legal institutions’;110rather, we are seeing a shift away from rigid, prescriptive 
institutional forms and structures, towards more responsive, specialist bodies operating within ‘less 
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hierarchical’ structures.111  
We can explore this perspective further by briefly considering two bodies that have (in the 
main) different jurisdictions – the Environmental Protection Authority and the specialist Environment 
Court.  Both have the multi-functional characteristics mentioned above but take different forms.  As 
part of the executive, with a ministerially appointed Board,  112the Environmental Protection Authority 
(EPA) monitors and reviews the efficacy of certain legislative regimes; advises the Minister as to 
appropriate regulatory developments;113 issues permits for the use and development of hazardous 
substances and new organisms, and for the import of ozone depleting substances;114 and enforces the 
climate change regulations.115 It also has an important adjudicatory role in deciding whether to grant 
‘marine consents’, permitting activities such as petroleum exploration and ocean-bed phosphate mining, 
in the exclusive economic zone and managing the environmental impacts of those activities. 
Interestingly while the EPA must interpret statute law and consider legal doctrine,116and conduct 
hearings to determine factual disputes and apply legal norms to findings,117 it does not have a judicial 
chair and (according to the empowering statute) need not have legally trained members in the 
adjudicative role.118Importantly however, its adjudicatory role is concerned with geographical areas 
where full sovereignty starts to diminish and private property or other existing rights are not impacted.  
In undertaking adjudication, the EPA invites submissions from the public, thus fostering full 
participation; it bases decision on what best promotes ‘sustainable management’ of the relevant 
resource;119and a wide-range of remedies is available to it.120As a relatively new creation, the EPA has 
issued few decisions to date and it is hard to see if any particular substantive or procedural norms are 
developing. Appeals are to the generalist courts, not the Environment Court. 
In contrast, the specialist Environment Court (NZEnvC) is both a judicial body and a court of 
expertise: tenured and independent judges sit with expert ‘lay’ commissioners. It makes decisions 
impacting public resources and private property and so individual rights may be impacted: hence the 
constitutional propriety of an independent court determination. The Court determines some first 
instance decisions, but is predominantly concerned with appeals from Local Authority decision-making 
that it hears de novo on the merits. It is not confined to legality review. It is the primary environmental 
adjudicative body in New Zealand, empowered specifically to determine cases under the RMA – and 
so all of the Court’s decisions must accord with the statutory mandate to ‘promote sustainable 
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management’ of the resources in question121 - but it also has jurisdiction under a number of other 
environmental statutes.122 In one sense it is a classic judicial body. It finds facts and applies the law to 
those facts, and interprets both statute law and planning documents that constitute regulations in the 
statutory scheme.123 It tends to follow litigious procedures (although, can control its own procedures 
and adopt an inquisitorial approach where appropriate),124and it also enforces the law (albeit , has a great 
deal of flexibility as to the enforcement approach it takes).125 But the Court also has a regulatory role 
and is explicitly empowered under the RMA to hear and determine disputes concerning local authority 
plans and policy-documents, i.e. statutory regulations, to refine those documents to ensure that they 
‘promote sustainable management’, and to give them final approval. In doing so, it must ensure full 
public participation.126 The Court also has a role more traditionally reserved to the administration: it 
licenses specific activities with regards to the take, use, development and discharge into land, air and 
water that are not automatically permitted, and in this sense is concerned with prediction, uncertainty, 
risk-evaluation and allocation. How to ‘promote sustainable management’ of a resource will be 
determined by the facts and relevant context of any given case but will be guided by the legislation and 
policy framework127 that the Court must in turn interpret or may have played a role in crafting. The 
Court has considerable flexibility in terms of procedure, methods of interpretation, the decision-making 
process (with legal and non-legal expertise feeding into both fact and law evaluation, and the application 
of law to facts) and remedies.128   
These select examples and brief survey given above reveal that the adjudicative landscape in 
our two nations differs. While equally pluralistic, New Zealand’s adjudicatory spectrum appears 
rational and capable of explanation; specialist, multi-functional bodies have been created that can 
respond to the challenges of environmental adjudication; and these bodies can be seen to form part of 
wider environmental governance. In light of this pluralism, is it possible to see Asimow’s adjudicative 
fulcrum at work in New Zealand environmental adjudication? We suggest that the New Zealand 
Environment Court appears sited at the adjudicatory fulcrum and this reality raises a number of 
interesting possibilities, explored below. 
 
C. The adjudicatory fulcrum 
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 Asimow’s ‘fulcrum’ test is premised upon the use of resources that best facilitate procedural fairness 
and substantive accuracy. There can be little doubt that (to date, at least) financial, administrative and 
legal resources have been invested in the Environment Court.129 Comprehensive procedural and 
evidential rules have developed and the Court has issued a series of Practice Notes that responds to the 
nature of disputes it hears.130  However, similar resources are available to the ordinary courts and many 
other adjudicatory bodies in New Zealand that hear ‘first’ and ‘final stage’ challenges. T o explain our 
contention that the NZEnvC provides an adjudicative fulcrum other factors are important.  
Firstly, decisions of the Court have significant collective impact on the ecological, economic 
and socio-cultural landscape of New Zealand. For example, it has resolved disputes concerning: the 
allocation of space in the coastal marine area for aquaculture; water-take for large-scale dairy irrigation; 
the displacement of endangered fauna for coal mining;131heritage demolition; the use of geothermal 
fluid for macro-electricity generation; protecting Maori land from compulsory acquisition; and rezoning 
protected land for development.132 This small snapshot illustrates the expansive remit of the Court and 
the wider impact of its decisions on New Zealanders’ wellbeing, which as Parliament has acknowledged 
in the past far exceeds that of the ordinary courts.133 But its decisions also mould the legal landscape 
and this factor is important for considering Asimow’s ‘substantive accuracy’. 
A critical point is that the Environment Court hears a massive amount of cases.  Many of those 
cases are reported in the general or specialist law reports and all decisions are made available to the 
public.134 In comparison, relatively few (non-RMA) environmental law cases either go directly or are 
successfully appealed to the superior courts, and very few appeals against Environment Court decisions 
are successful. Between 2006-2016, the NZEnvC issued 937 substantive judgments; 210 appeals were 
lodged in the High Court; 53 were allowed or part allowed (5.6%); 12 were further appealed to the 
Court of Appeal of which two were allowed, three dismissed, five were abandoned and (at the date of 
writing) two remained outstanding.135 During this period, only 21 reported cases were concerned with 
non-RMA environmental legislation in the higher courts.136 As a result, case law focuses predominantly 
on RMA disputes before the NZEnvC, and to a lesser extent, the other 16-plus legislative regimes that 
the Court has jurisdiction over, and rests primarily on the Court’s reasoning. Beyond a quantitative 
analysis, the NZEnvC appears to play a significant qualitative role in norm development.  To explore 
this contention further, we can consider and compare the role of the ordinary courts to that of the 
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NZEnvC in norm development. 
As with the UK, the ordinary courts are concerned with legality: there is no ‘final stage’ merits 
review.  Environmental problems in New Zealand are predominantly managed by legislative regimes, 
and the pervasive focus in environmental appeals on a point of law or judicial review to the superior 
courts concerns statutory interpretation.137 The development of environmental law might therefore be 
categorised as ‘dependent common law’, i.e. ‘the creation of norms generated as a by-product of the 
application of statutory and constitutional norms’ during adjudication .138 Even so, the higher courts 
development of environmental law has been relatively conservative. International environmental law 
principles appear to play a limited role,139and like the scenario in the UK, the Court of Appeal has 
emphasised that judicial review of decisions preventing participation does ‘not demand a closer 
scrutiny’ in environmental cases than non-environmental law cases unless the statute requires it.140 The 
effect is that the courts tend to defer to first stage decision-makers rather than providing for rights of 
public participation in environmental matters per se. 
Most environmental statutes contain purpose sections to aid a purposive interpretation and / or 
set a general policy direction,141and while some judgements acknowledge wider interpretative frames 
beyond the statutory confines, factors external to the national statute are seldom determinative. For 
example, in Friends of Turitea Reserve, Baragwanath J found the High Court could take judicial notice 
of increasing environmental concerns in society, and that ‘statutes are no longer considered in isolation 
but, where reasonably possible, as forming part of a wider and seamless public policy’ that includes 
sustainable development. 142 Nevertheless, in refusing to protect a local reserve for the conservation of 
indigenous flora and fauna and sanctioning the development of a wind-farm, the Court found it did ‘not 
follow that the basic functions of local government … were to be performed outside t he scope of the 
Reserves Act.’143 This relatively conservative or confined focus is standard.  
The ordinary courts face significant interpretative difficulties however when statutory purpose 
sections contain vague or conflicting principles, which is common with sustainability-focused statues. 
In New Zealand Recreational Fishing Council v Sanford the Supreme Court found that the Fisheries 
Act 1996 expresses ‘two competing social policies’ i.e. utilisation and sustainability, but the Act 
recognises the potential for conflict, and a pragmatic approach ultimately requires that ‘utilisation must 
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not be such as to jeopardise sustainability’.144In the King Salmon case, when faced with making legal 
sense of the purpose section of the RMA that contains multiple conflicting principles, the Supreme 
Court refused to subject the statutory section to close interpretation eschewing its value as an 
interpretative tool and stating instead that it was a guiding statement of general policy.145 As the superior 
courts have explicitly acknowledged, it is precisely for this reason that the specialist NZEnvC exists 
and has the power to undertake merits review.146  
Clearly, the NZEnvC has certain features that might limit its contribution to the development 
of environmental law if a strictly legalistic or formalist approach is adopted, but its norm generating-
role has significant implications if conceived of as part of the broader governance structures.  The first 
feature is that, as an inferior court, the decisions of the NZEnvC do not constitute de jure authoritative 
precedent.147  However, in practice, decisions of the Court act as norms for local authorities (who make 
the vast majority of resource management decisions) as well as informing other decisions of the Court 
itself,148 and while the Court hears appeals de novo from authorities, decisions may also act as a review 
of administrative action, helping to influence future administrative behaviour. Further, it is possible to 
see a deferential approach by the superior courts to the Environment Court, 149particularly in its 
interpretation of planning documents, deemed regulations under the RMA.150  
Secondly, the Court does not have general jurisdiction, rather it is empowered and constrained 
by statute.151 So, like the superior courts, the NZEnvC is concerned with ‘dependant common law’.  
Nevertheless we can chart a more creative process of developing legal norms. In practice, given the 
inherently interstitial nature of environmental legislation, the Court has developed a vast body of 
jurisprudence that forms the web of environmental case law in New Zealand and fills in the statutory 
lacunas. Often the development of legal principles over a line of cases may appear to have a very slender 
tether to the statutory text. To give one example, the Court has had to develop an entire jurisprudence 
on uncertainty, risk evaluation, and risk management with extremely limited guidance from the 
regulatory regime, in order to make sense of the predictive role that decision -makers play in 
environmental management. With two scant statutory references upon which to draw152 the Court 
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developed expansive doctrine and procedural mechanisms for managing risks into the future.153  Case 
law addresses: the rules of evidence and burdens and standards or proof;154 approaches to expert 
evidence;155 and the development of novel remedies, such as adaptive management that respond to 
uncertainty with continual information gathering and the consequential adjustment of permit 
conditions.156 Jurisprudence from the Court has therefore had a profound impact on the manifestation 
of precaution within New Zealand ‘legal culture’,157 giving meaning to a core principle of 
environmental law - the precautionary principle - in this national context.  
There are also numerous examples of the Court crafting complex environmental or ecological 
phenomena into concepts that can be used in legal contexts. For example in the ‘Lake Wakatipu cases’158 
the Court gave meaning to the statutory term ‘landscape’ – a layered social and ecological concept that 
is difficult to translate into a simple legal definition for uniform application. Rather the Court created 
schemata for the gathering of evidence that would help decision-makers fit factual contexts within legal 
frameworks. In doing so, the Court impacted the future administrative behaviour of local auth orities 
(who have a statutory duty to identify and protect outstanding natural landscapes via planning 
documents) and provided a guide for future litigation (that may bring into dispute those wanting to 
develop outstanding natural landscapes with conservationists). The development of the T reaty of 
Waitangi159 jurisprudence is another example of the attempts of the Court to translate socio -cultural 
ontologies – such as ‘waahi tapu’160 and kaitiakitanga161 - into a common language usable in legal 
settings, and demonstrates the contribution of the Court to wider environmental law norms concerning 
‘access to justice as recognition’162 for the indigenous Maori peoples. 
How it develops these interpretations or dependent common law is important. As a specialist 
court, the NZEnvC is well positioned to examine difficult concepts and give legal meaning to them ‘in 
light of their actual use’.163  Commissioners contribute their expertise to the legal interpretation of socio-
cultural and ecologically complex statutory terms and the higher courts have explained that the NZEnvC 
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has to call upon ‘the whole range of its collective experience’164 in determining both ‘legislative 
facts’165and understanding policy documents. The legal nature of the Court means that it is willing to 
look beyond the evidence produced by the parties, and refer to a wider range of materials to help 
interpretation,166 so adopting something akin to a ‘Brandeis brief-type’ approach.167 Because of the 
Court’s specialist nature, coupled with its power to hear matters de novo on the merits, the difficulties 
experienced in the UK context disappear.168 
Accordingly, the Environment Court fulfils an important role in expository justice and acutely 
reflects Spann’s observation that ‘it is the function of the judiciary to give meaning to the general, often 
abstract, policies adopted by the legislature, through reference to specific factual contexts’.169 This 
exposition can, in turn, provide useful information to the executive and the legislature170and the 
NZEnvC is part of a feedback loop.  In particular, problem-solving approaches crafted through 
adjudication before the Court, feed back to other branches of government and impact regulatory 
development. Through dispute-resolution, the Court has created novel remedies such as ‘environmental 
compensation’ or ‘offsetting’,171 and ‘adaptive management’,172 best categorized as forms of 
experimentalist intervention. T he superior courts have confirmed the legal validity of these 
developments173 and the Government has responded to the Environment Court’s lead by adopting these 
mechanisms, developing them into wider policy responses,174 and adapting the concepts for use in other 
regulatory regimes.175Thus, we see a synergist process: court-created responses to discrete 
environmental problems have in turn informed other branches of government. In validating the 
Environment Court’s wider influence in norm-development, perhaps we ‘find ourselves with a new and 
richer understanding of what we mean by ‘law’’ in this context.176  
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The result of all this is that Asimow’s adjudicatory fulcrum appears to rest with the 
Environment Court. Identifying this fulcrum leads us to question whether Asimow’s analysis has deeper 
ramifications: can the identification of a fulcrum have implications for legal norm-development? In our 
New Zealand example, it would appear so.  Importantly, these norm-developments are coherent because 
the specialist Court is responsive enough to address the inherent challenges in environmental problem 
solving and operating within an integrated regulatory frame, and they are (relatively) consistent because 
one body with one institutional culture is making the bulk of decisions.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
By comparing the adjudicatory spectrum in England and Wales and New Zealand we show how the 
forms and structures of adjudication create complex and subtle influences on the way environmental 
law develops. Adjudicatory pluralism in New Zealand mirrors to an extent that in England and Wales. 
However, there the similarities diverge. In contrast to England and Wales, the legal landscape in New 
Zealand has responded more readily to Rubin’s exhortation that the ‘problems of modernity … require 
new rules and particularised remedies, and deliberately designed agencies’.177 In terms of Asimow’s 
classification system ‘adjudicatory resources’ in New Zealand appear most heavily invested in the ‘first-
stage challenge’, and primarily in appeals to the specialist Environment Court. This has led to the Court 
creating a large body of jurisprudence, and in both quantitative and qualitative terms playing a major 
role in expository justice. In formalist terms, this creates an odd scenario with an inferior court making 
most of the jurisprudence, so disrupting the normal hierarchies of law.  But the dominance of this 
specialist body, sited within a holistic regulatory frame, has led to the development of coherent norms 
and avoided the inconsistency and tensions that pull UK doctrinal development in different directions. 
In New Zealand-environmental management, ‘court-law’ does not appear to stand in opposition to 
environmental governance, limiting and bracketing as the purist, judicial review-heavy approach in 
England and Wales does. Rather, through the role of the NZEnvC, adjudication becomes an integral 
part of environmental governance, and in checking for ‘legality’, the superior courts need exercise the 
lightest of supervisory roles.   
In contrast, it is difficult to identify a clear adjudicatory axis in England and Wales that exists 
outside the ‘ordinary’ courts, and the courts remain anchored to a significant degree in established 
doctrines of law derived from disciplines and understandings that are not unique or specific to 
environmental law. The law is approached within traditional structures set up to protect individual rights 
and give force to constitutional principles, and the attempts by the courts to maintain a dichotomy 
between legalism and merits review is precarious. In a large part, this is because the inherent challenges 
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of environmental dispute resolution, magnified by the structures of the law itself (and reliance on 
background norms in EU law). This, however, gives rise to pressures, resulting in doctrinal 
inconsistency. In a sense, it is difficult to see how the overly formalistic approach to environmental 
adjudication is contributing to equality and certainty. In fact it may actually be hindering consistent and 
coherent dispute-resolution of environmental problems. Fundamentally, our analysis raises the 
interesting possibility that Asimow’s thesis can be extended to demonstrate that a clear adjudicatory 
focus - or lack of focus - impacts upon the role that adjudication plays in the development of 
environmental norms – an important possibility worthy of deep study by legal scholars.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
